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Page v. Bartels: A "Total Effects"




In a strange role reversal, a group of New Jersey Republicans
filed a federal suit with a coalition of minority voters claiming that
the state's redistricting plan diluted minority voting strength. 1 A
three-judge panel unanimously rejected the Republicans' claims in
Page v. Bartels.2 The decision marked a fundamental shift in the
interpretation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act ("Section 2"),
which guarantees an equal opportunity for political participation. 3
Section 2 calls for a "totality of the circumstances" analysis to
determine whether a voting rights violation has occurred. 4 The
Supreme Court's seminal Section 2 case, Thornburg v. Gingles,5
however, adopted a bright-line, three-prong test as the threshold
measure of racial vote dilution.6 Lower courts applied the Gingles
test rigidly without incorporating a "totality of the circumstances"
analysis.7
Page applied the three-prong test, but, in marked contrast to
other vote dilution cases, it focused on the total effect of the
redistricting plan rather than on the rigid dictates of the Gingles
* J.D. expected 2003, University of Minnesota. B.A. 1999, magna cum laude,
Carleton College. I would like to thank the editors and staff of the Journal of Law
& Inequality, particularly Brendan Flaherty, for spending countless hours working
with me on this article. I also thank Professor Guy Charles for his direction.
Special thanks go to my family and friends for their patience and support
throughout this project.
1. Page v. Bartels, 144 F.Supp.2d 346 (D.N.J. 2001).
2. Id.
3. See infra note 23.
4. See infra note 27 and accompanying text (stating factors recommended by the
Senate Judiciary Committee).
5. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
6. Id. at 49-51. See infra note 30 (discussing the difference between Congress'
analysis and the Supreme Court's interpretation of Section 2).
7. See infra note 38.
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test.8 Soon after Page, New Jersey held primary elections under
the new redistricting plan.9 The results overwhelmingly affirmed
the Page court's prediction that the total effect of the redistricting
plan would enhance minority participation and choice rather than
diminish it. 10  In the November general elections, minority
members retained seats in the legislature, and in two of the newly
redrawn districts, all six minority incumbents were reelected. 11
The Republican claims, already deemed incorrect in theory, were
completely undermined in fact. 12 More importantly, the election
results added substantially to the impact Page will have in
subsequent Section 2 cases.
Part I of this Comment describes the Gingles bright-line,
three-prong test used by lower courts as a guide to eliminate
legally insignificant Section 2 claims.13 Part II discusses the Page
decision and the court's "total effects" approach to applying the
Gingles bright-line test.14 Part III analyzes the Page court's "total
effects" approach and shows that it better evaluates racial vote
dilution claims under Section 2 than does the traditional Gingles
bright-line analysis. 15 The goal of this Comment is to demonstrate
that the Page "total effects" approach provides an improved
analytical framework for racial vote dilution claims under Section
2.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Guarantees Equal
Political Opportunity for Minorities in the "Totality of
Circumstances."
Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act in 1965 to prohibit
states from using racially discriminatory practices, such as poll
taxes and literacy tests.16 Between the enactment of the Voting
8. See infra notes 91-105.
9. Sam Hirsch, Unpacking Page v. Bartles: A Fresh Redistricting Paradigm
Emerges in New Jersey, 1 ELECTION L.J. 7, 18 (2002).
10. Id. at 18-19.
11. See David M. Herszenhorn, Democrats Win Assembly in New Jersey, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 7, 2001, at Di. See also Results: The Races for New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 7, 2001, at D7 (listing the winners of each race for New Jersey State offices).
12. See Herszenhord, supra note 11, at D1.
13. See infra notes 16-70 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 71-109 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 110-148 and accompanying text.
16. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1965). The Act safeguards the
rights provided by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. See id. The
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Rights Act and Congress' amendments to Section 2 in 1982,
plaintiffs rarely sought relief under Section 2.17 In 1980, the
Supreme Court made racial vote dilution claims under Section 2
nearly impossible to sustain with its decision in City of Mobile v.
Bolden.18 The Court held that to sustain a racial vote dilution
claim, plaintiffs must prove that discriminatory intent drove the
challenged electoral practice. 19 The Bolden plaintiffs - all of
Mobile's Black voters-argued that by holding city-wide, "at large"
elections rather than breaking the city into districts corresponding
to each of the three council seats, the city impermissibly diluted
the Black vote in violation of Section 2.20 The Court held that
Section 2 did not grant greater rights than the Fifteenth
Amendment and without evidence of discriminatory intent, any
racial vote dilution claim under Section 2 must fail.2 1
Bolden's intent requirement severely reduced voting rights
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that "No State shall ... deny to any person...
the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fifteenth
Amendment guarantees that a citizen's right to vote may not be "denied or
abridged . . . on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." U.S.
CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
17. Virtually all voting rights litigation prior to 1982 was based on a Section 5
racial vote dilution theory. See Racial and Ethnic Discrimination, Section 5
of the Voting Rights Act: Preclearance Requirements, at
http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/departments/scr/redistred2000/CH3part3.htm
(Sept. 14, 2001) (summarizing the function of Section 5). Certain jurisdictions with
a history of discrimination are subject to "preclearance" under Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act. See id. Jurisdictions subject to "preclearance" must submit any
change in a voting qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure to
the U.S. Attorney General for approval. See id. Any change that would reduce the
minority voters' right to the electoral franchise violates the Act. See generally,
SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN, & RICHARD H. PILDES, THE LAW OF
DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 605-09 (2d ed. 2001)
[hereinafter LAW OF DEMOCRACY]. The U.S. Attorney General analyzes whether a
jurisdiction has reduced minority voting strength by comparing the existing
districting scheme to the new plan. See id. The U.S. Attorney General considers a
number of factors, including whether the new plan fragments or concentrates
minority populations, ignores traditional districting criteria, disregards natural
boundaries, or does not heed the jurisdiction's stated standards. 42 U.S.C. § 1973
(1982). A court only strikes a proposed districting plan if its net effect is to
minimize minority voters' right to vote when compared to the benchmark plan. See
Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976). Although plaintiffs in these
jurisdictions preferred Section 5 litigation because it provided quicker solutions,
Section 5 offered limited help to minority groups. Id. at 147-48 (Marshall, J.
dissenting). Section 5 could only prevent racial vote dilution among certain
jurisdictions and remedies were limited to preserving the status quo (which
presented little relief to minority groups whose right to vote was drastically
diminished from the beginning). Id. at 132.
18. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
19. Id. at 61-62.
20. Id. at 58.
21. Id. at 61-62.
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litigation and several cases were remanded for reconsideration
under the new standard.22 Within two years, Congress responded
by amending Section 2.23 The amendments rendered Bolden's
intent requirement obsolete by explicitly eliminating the intent
requirement for a racial vote dilution claim. 24 The amended
Section 2 substantially expanded the protections afforded minority
groups by guaranteeing equal access to all stages of the electoral
process. 2 5
22. See Armand Derfner, Vote Dilution and the Voting Rights Act Amendments of
1982, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 161 (Chandler Davidson ed. 1989).
23. As amended, Section 2 states:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice,
or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political
subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the
right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color,
or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this
title, as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality of
circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to
nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally
open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by
subsection (a) of this section, in that its members have less opportunity
than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process
and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which members
of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political
subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That
nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected
class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982). Besides Bolden, another reason why the Voting Rights Act
was reviewed and amended was that it was about to expire. See LAW OF
DEMOCRACY, supra note 17, at 747. Prior to the 1982 amendments, courts
generally decided districting cases based on constitutional, not statutory grounds.
See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) (deciding on Fourteenth Amendment
grounds); United Jewish Org. of Williamsburg, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977)
(deciding on Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and Section 5 grounds);
Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors of Hinds County, Miss, 554 F.2d 139 (5th Cir.
1977)(deciding on Fourteenth Amendment grounds). Section 2 provided stronger
statutory grounds for deciding vote dilution cases. LAW OF DEMOCRACY, supra note
17, at 746-47.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1973. The House characterized discrimination under Section 2 as
the extent to which "minority groups are denied 'access' to the political process
'through vote dilution and other discriminatory devices and practices."' Thomas M.
Boyd & Stephen J. Markman, The 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act: A
Legislative History, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347, 1366 (1983) (quoting letter from
Peter W. Rodino, Jr. to Don Edwards (July 14, 1981)).
25. Boyd & Markman, supra note 24, at 1390 (quoting Hearings on the Voting
Rights Act Before the Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Committee on
the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 200-01 [hereinafter Senate Hearing]
(statement of Senator Charles W. Mahias)). Throughout the hearings, debate often
centered on what threshold question judges should ask when evaluating evidence
in a section 2 claim. Id. at 1390-1410. Benjamin Hooks, the Executive Director of
the NAACP, testified that he felt efforts to ascertain the parameters of the test had
been reduced to "wholly uninstructive statements of the sort that 'you know
discrimination when you see it' or so precise as to require a mathematical
2003]
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The Senate Report accompanying the Section 2 amendments
listed seven factors to consider in determining whether a plaintiff
had established a prima facie case for racial vote dilution.2 6 The
factors were: (1) the extent of any history of racial discrimination;
(2) the extent of racial vote polarization; (3) the extent to which
the state or subdivision had used voting practices or procedures
that would increase the opportunity for discrimination; (4)
whether minority group members had been denied access to a
candidate slating process; (5) the extent to which minority group
members suffered the effects of discrimination in other areas such
as education, which hindered their ability to participate effectively
in the political process; (6) whether political campaigns had been
marked by racial appeals; and (7) the extent to which minority
candidates had been elected to office. 27  The Senate report
anticipated that analysis of these factors would clearly show
whether an electoral system or practice denied minority groups
equal access to the political process. 28 The Senate's test was
designed to all courts to assess a vote dilution claim on the basis of
demonstrable effects rather than the defendant's motivation.
2 9
definiteness creating "proportional representation"). Id. at 1400 (quoting Senate
Hearing at 253). Utah Senator, Orin Hatch shared Hooks' concern that the
amendments would extend to redefine the concept of discrimination as
"'proportional representation"'-where "if 55% of Baltimore is [B]lack, that 55%
ought to be represented as sole [BIlack districts or at least majority [B]lack
districts."' Id. at 1390 (quoting Senate Hearing at 200 (statement of Senator Orin
Hatch)). Proponents of the bill advocated a totality of circumstances approach. Id.
at 1390 (statement of Senator Mathias). Senator Robert Dole proposed a
compromise: The new language in Section 2 would retain the "results" language of
the House bill, but would include a new subsection that would limit its parameters.
Id. at 1415. These parameters were adopted from pre-Bolden cases, White u.
Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), and Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir.
1973), both of which used a totality of the circumstances approach. See S. REP. NO.
97-417, at 28-30 (1982). The Dole compromise apparently resolved the dispute, as
it became part of the enacted version. 42 U.S.C. § 1973. The new subsection
provided that the issue to be decided under the results test is whether political
processes are equally open to minority and non-minority voters, and also states
that the section does not establish a right to proportional representation. Id.
26. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28-29 (1982).
27. Id.
28. See id.
29. See id., at 28.
As the Supreme Court has repeatedly noted, discriminatory election
systems or practices which operate, designedly or otherwise, to minimize or
cancel out the voting strength and political effectiveness of minority
groups, are an impermissible denial of the right to have one's vote fully




B. The Supreme Court's Failure to Clarify the Gingles'
"Bright Line" Test Has Triggered Inconsistent
Application of the Law.
Two years after enactment of the amendments, the Supreme
Court reduced the Senate's seven factors to a bright-line, three-
prong test in Thornburg v. Gingles.30 The test required that a
minority group prove: (1) "it is sufficiently large and
geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-
member district;"3 1 (2) "it is politically cohesive;" 32 and (3) in the
absence of special circumstances, bloc voting by the White majority
usually defeats its preferred candidate." 33  In Gingles, Black
citizens of North Carolina challenged a redistricting plan under
Section 2.34 The Gingles plaintiffs argued that the legislature had
diluted their votes by drawing multi-member, rather than single-
member, districts in which plaintiffs were "submerg[ed] . . .in a
white majority."35 Although the Court recognized that the Senate
Report factors were relevant to evaluate a claim of racial vote
dilution,3 6 the Court reduced the Senate factors to three essential
elements.3 7 Under this framework, if a court determines that a
30. 478 U.S. 30, 45 (1986) (explaining that the Senate did not specify that any
number of factors be proved or that a majority of them point one way or the other,
and that the factors in the Senate report were not comprehensive or exclusive).
31. Id. at 50. In Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146 (1993), plaintiffs attempted to
get around Gingles' first prong by relying on footnote 12 of Justice Brennan's
opinion, which expressly reserved the question, stating: "whether § 2 permits, and
if it does, what standards should pertain to, a claim brought by a minority group,
that is not sufficiently large and compact to constitute a majority in a single-
member district, alleging that the use of a multimember district impairs its ability
to influence elections." Id. at 157 (quoting Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 at 46, n.12). The
Voinovich Court left unanswered the question whether such "influence-dilution"
claims are viable under Section 2. Id. at 154. The Voinovich plaintiffs claimed that
the redistricting plan deprived Black voters of equal political access by creating a
small number of districts with a disproportionately large Black voter population.
Id. at 149-150. The plan allegedly minimized the number of districts in which
Black voters could have been placed. Id. The Court assumed for the purpose of
resolving the case that plaintiffs had stated a cognizable Section 2 claim, even
though Black voters did not constitute a majority in a single-member district. Id.
at 154. Black voters would have been an influential minority capable of electing
their preferred candidates with the help of White voters. Id. The Court ultimately
rejected the plaintiffs' claim because it failed the Gingles' third prong (the
requirement of sufficient white majority bloc voting to frustrate the election of the
minority group's candidate of choice). Id. at 158.
32. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 at 51.
33. Id. at 50-51.
34. Id. at 35.
35. Id. at 46.
36. Id. at 48.
37. Id. at 49.
2003]
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plaintiff satisfies the threshold three-prong test, the court may
then evaluate the other Senate factors and other relevant evidence
under the totality of the circumstances. 38
Lower courts have interpreted the first prong of Gingles to
require inquiry into more than simple population numbers. They
have generally held that plaintiffs may satisfy Gingles' first prong
- size and geographical density of the minority group - by showing
that the minority group constitutes more than half of the voting
age population, and not, as a literal reading might suggest, more
than half of the overall population. 39
The second Gingles prong requires that the minority group
show political cohesion - that a significant number of its members
usually vote for the same candidate.40 In Growe v. Emison,4 1 the
Supreme Court considered, but did not decide, the issue of
whether lower courts may find such cohesion in minority
jurisdictions with significant ethnic and language diversity.4 2 In
38. See id. at 48. With its three factors, the Gingles Court intended to create a
threshold test, not a dispositive one. See id. at 50 (describing the three
circumstances as "necessary preconditions"). However, lower courts have used the
Gingles test exclusively without fully evaluating the other factors. See, e.g.,
Solomon v. Liberty County, 899 F.2d 1012, 1017 (1lth Cir. 1990) (finding proof of
Gingles' three factors "both necessary ... and sufficient"). The Solomon Court
suggested that the Senate's "totality of the circumstances" analysis was valuable
for the light that it can shed on Gingles'factors. Id. at 1017.
39. See, e.g., Romero v. City of Pomona, 883 F.2d 1418, 1426 (9th Cir. 1989)
(holding that the appropriate measure for the first Gingles prong was the eligible
minority voter population rather than the total minority population). See also
Overton v. City of Austin, 871 F.2d 529, 539 (5th Cir. 1989) (noting that expert's
analysis of the correlation between race and voter preference was of limited value
because expert disregarded age levels and voter registration within minority
population); McNeil v. Springfield Park Dist., 851 F.2d 937, 944-45 (7th Cir. 1988)
(concluding that "substantial evidence and common sense" dictate that Gingles'
first prong requires a majority in the voting age population). But see Garza v.
County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 774-75 (9th Cir. 1990) (analyzing district
based on total population rather than voting population as minority group had
disproportionately greater numbers of non-voters); Jennifer C. Day, Projection of
the Voting-Age Population for States: November 1998, CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS, U.S. Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics Administration,
1 (April 1998) (noting that the "voting age population includes all U.S. residents 18
years and over" including those ineligible to vote "such as noncitizens, convicted
felons, and prison inmates").
40. See MULTIETHNIC COALITION BUILDING IN LOS ANGELES: A TwO-DAY
SYMPOSIUM, NOVEMBER 19-20 1993 (Eui-Young Yu & Edward T. Chang, eds.,
1995); Bryan 0. Jackson, Elisabeth R. Gerber, & Bruce E. Cain, Coalition Prospects
in a Multi-Racial Society: African-American Attitudes Toward Other Minority
Groups, 47 POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY, 277-94 (1994).
41. 507 U.S. 25 (1993).
42. See id. The Emison Court "assum[ed] [without deciding] that it was
permissible for the District Court to combine distinct ethnic and language minority
groups for purposes of assessing compliance with § 2." (emphasis added). Id. at 41.
[Vol. 21:192
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Nixon v. Kent County4 3 , the Sixth Circuit held that a coalition of
Blacks and Hispanics did not constitute a "minority group" under
the Gingles test even though the coalition was politically
cohesive. 44  The Nixon court predicted that if multi-ethnic
coalitions were deemed "minority groups" for Section 2 purposes,
legislators with invidious motives would be free to "pack" districts
with two ethnic groups, thereby submerging the distinct interests
of both groups. 45 The Court also concluded that extending Section
2 protection to groups conjoined for political reasons would
"wrench the Act from its ideological and constitutional
foundations."46
Although only the Fifth Circuit has expressly held "coalition
suits" permissible, 4 7 all of the other circuits have assumed their
validity. 4 8 These coalition suits arise out of a contemporary
political climate that fosters interracial aliances.4 9  Judicial
recognition of multi-ethnic voting blocs is sensible for three
reasons. First, Blacks and Hispanics prefer the same candidate in
a growing number of jurisdictions. 50  Second, Whites are
increasingly voting along party lines rather than racial lines to
elect minority candidates. 5 1 Third, a growing number of people in
the United States think of themselves as belonging to many
different racial categories. 5 2
43. 76 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1391.
46. Id. at 1391-92.
47. See Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1988) (permitting a
group of Black and Hispanic voters to claim a Section 2 violation).
48. See, e.g., Badillo v. City of Stockton, Cal., 956 F.2d 884 (9th Cir. 1992)
(recognizing that coalition claims are permissible as long as the Gingles test is
satisfied); Concerned Citizens v. Hardee County Bd., 906 F.2d 524 (11th Cir. 1990)
(noting that two minority groups may be a single Section 2 minority); Knox v.
Milwaukee County Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 607 F.Supp. 1112 (E.D.Wis. 1985)
(allowing a group of Black and Hispanic citizens to bring a Section 2 claim).
49. See RAPHAEL F. SONENSHEIN, POLITICS IN BLACK AND WHITE: RACE AND
POWER IN LOS ANGELES, xv (Princeton Univ. Press 1993).
50. Id.
51. See RICHARD A. KEISER, SUBORDINATION OR EMPOWERMENT? AFRICAN-
AMERICAN LEADERSHIP AND THE STRUGGLE FOR URBAN POLITICAL POWER 90-158
(Oxford University Press 1997) (discussing the formation and success of biracial
political coalitions in Philadelphia and Atlanta). See also infra note 99 and
accompanying text (noting that the most salient factor in determining the outcome
of the election is not the race of the candidate, but the party affiliation).
52. See Tamar Jacoby, An End to Counting By Race? 111 COMMENTARY 6, 37-40
(June 2001). In response to the change in the racial makeup of the United States,
the Office of Management and Budget revised the categories for racial
identification in the 2000 census. See Racial and Ethnic
Classifications Used in Census 2000 and Beyond, at
20031
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If Section 2 plaintiffs sufficiently establish political cohesion,
the third prong of the Gingles test then requires a showing that
Whites and Blacks 53 generally support different candidates and
that losses by Blacks at the polls are somehow connected to
candidate or voter race.54 Although six Justices agreed on this
articulation of the prong, the Justices were divided over the
reasoning behind, and the articulation of, the plan.5
5
Justice Brennan argued that the only relevant inquiry with
respect to the third prong is whether the electoral choices made by
Black and White voters are different - not the reasons for that
difference. 56 For Brennan, the plaintiffs need not show that the
race of the voter or candidate was the primary cause of voter
behavior, 57 rather, a mere correlation between the race of the
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/race/racefactcb.html (Apr. 12,
2000). In the past, census respondents could only select one box to indicate their
racial identity. See Jacoby, supra at 38. In the 2000 census, respondents could
select more than one race to indicate their racial identity, or they could write in
their race. See id. Census results showed that many Americans from every region,
age group, and color were of mixed heritage. See id. Forty-eight percent of those
who identified themselves as Hispanic also checked "White," and 42 percent
marked "Other." See id. Five percent of Blacks, six percent of Hispanics, 14
percent of Asian Americans, and 40 percent of American Indians checked more
than one box. See id. In New York City, as many as one in four people identified
themselves as multiracial individuals. See id.
53. The Gingles Court used the term "minority group." Thornburg v. Gingles, 478
U.S. 30, 51 (1986). This article uses the term "Black" when discussing Gingles for
the sake of simplicity.
54. Id. at .50-51.
55. See id. at 82. Justice O'Connor represented four other justices in her
concurrence: Justices Powell, Burger, and Rehnquist. Id. at 83-105. Justice White
concurred in a separate opinion. Id. at 82-83.
56. Id. at 63 (noting that the central inquiry under Section 2, whether there is
less opportunity to participate in the electoral process, only demands that Blacks
and Whites vote differently, not why they vote differently). According to Brennan,
plaintiffs only need to demonstrate a correlation between the race of the voter and
the level of voter support for certain candidates. Id. at 61-62 (discussing that only
a bivariate regression analysis is necessary to show polarized voting). Bivariate
regression analysis would show the statistical significance of two factors: race and
candidate selection. Id. at 61. Brennan was concerned that courts would inquire
into whether Blacks and Whites vote differently because of socioeconomic
characteristics. Id. at 64-67. This would defeat any claim of racial polarization
where socioeconomic characteristics could describe the Black and White voting
blocs. Id. at 65. Brennan thought plaintiffs should be able to establish a racial
vote dilution claim even if race and socioeconomic characteristics were closely
correlated. See id. at 64-67. Brennan noted that the logic and legislative history
behind the Voting Rights Act does not demand otherwise. Id. at 64-65.
57. Id. at 61-62 (rejecting appellants' argument that only multiple regression
analysis would be adequate evidence of polarized voting). Multiple regression
analysis takes into account other variables which might also explain voters'
choices, including party affiliation, age, religion, income, incumbency, education,
campaign expenditures. Id. at 61 (citation omitted).
[Vol. 21:192
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voter and level of voter support for certain candidates is
sufficient. 58
Five Justices disagreed with Brennan's reasoning in
Gingles.59 They argued that the threshold inquiry should evaluate
whether causes other than race, such as partisan affiliation,
explain divergent voting patterns between Blacks and Whites.60
In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor argued that Brennan's
approach essentially created a right to roughly proportional
representation - a result directly conflicting with the Senate
compromise.6 1 Her approach advocated consideration of all factors
bearing on whether the minority group has less opportunity to
participate in the electoral process than other members of the
electorate. 62
Despite disagreement over how to measure polarized voting,
the Justices agreed that polarized voting is the evidentiary
centerpiece of a vote dilution claim.6 3 Polarized voting, where
Blacks vote for a certain candidate and Whites vote differently,
exaggerates White political power and minimizes Black voting
strength.64 The Gingles Court incorporated this inquiry into each
58. Id. at 62.
59. See supra note 55.
60. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 83-104.
61. Id. at 84 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that Congress wanted to allow
vote dilution claims, but not create a proportional representation right for minority
voters).
62. See id. at 99 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Some lower courts have adopted the
O'Connor's approach. The Fifth Circuit, for example, required plaintiffs to show
results of a multivariate regression analysis that determined the causes of racially
divergent voting patterns. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens, Council No.
4434 v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 850-53 (5th Cir. 1993). Since the record showed
that partisan affiliation, not race, best explained the different voting patterns
among minority and White citizens in the contested counties, the court rejected the
plaintiffs' Section 2 claim. Id. at 893-94. The court considered the totality of the
circumstances, including the representatives' responsiveness to minorities'
concerns, and ultimately held that Section 2 would not provide grounds for relief
for mere political defeat at the polls. Id.
63. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 55 (stating that courts and commentators agree that
polarized voting is a key element of a vote dilution claim). See also Samuel
Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The Transformation of
Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1833, 1852-53 (1992) (summarizing
that polarized voting was the evidentiary centerpiece of a Section 2 claim according
to the Gingles Court). Lower courts have focused on evidence of polarized voting.
See generally McMillan v. Escambia County, 748 F.2d 1037, 1043 (5th Cir. 1984);
United States v. Marengo County Comm'n, 731 F.2d 1546, 1566 (11th Cir. 1984);
Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 223 (5th Cir. 1978); Johnson v. Halifax County, 594
F.Supp. 161, 170 (E.D.N.C. 1984).
64. Gingles, 478. U.S. at 49-50 (1986). See also Issacharoff, supra note 63, at
1858-59 (explaining the necessary emergence of a group-based inquiry).
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prong of its test.6 5 The emphasis on polarized voting shifted the
focus of voting rights litigation from ensuring that minorities were
able to elect as many minority candidates as possible
(proportionate to the minority population) to ensuring that
polarized voting would not minimize minority voting strength.
6 6
Despite the Court's emphasis on evidence of polarized voting,
lower courts and the Justice Department required that
jurisdictions create (or retain) as many majority-minority districts
as possible.6 7  The Department of Justice has authority to
"preclear" the redistricting plans of jurisdictions that have a
history of racial discrimination. 68 Section 5 of the Act requires
that those jurisdictions gain the Justice Department's approval
before implementing their redistricting plans. 69 Thus, under the
authority of Section 5, the Justice Department adopted a policy
that required states to maximize majority-minority districts even
when the minority population was geographically dispersed.
70
II. PAGE V. BARTELS: A NEW, FLEXIBLE, "TOTAL
EFFECTS" APPROACH
The battle over how best to implement the amended Section 2
set the stage for a legal battle between Republicans and
Democrats over New Jersey's redistricting plan.7 1 When the
65. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 56.
66. Id. See also supra notes 63-65 (noting that this approach ensured equal
opportunities, not equal outcomes).
67. See United Jewish Org. of Williamsburgh v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 164 (1977)
(holding that it was reasonable for the Attorney General to conclude that a
minority population around 65% would be required to achieve enough minority
voters to constitute a majority in one district); Racial and Ethnic Discrimination, at
http:///www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/departments/scr/redist/red2000/Ch3partl.htm
(last visited Oct. 26, 2002).
68. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
69. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
70. See Racial and Ethnic Discrimination, at
http:///www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/departments/scr/redistlred2OOO/Ch3partl.htm
(last visited Oct. 26, 2002). As a result, when some plans were redrawn to meet
Justice Department requirements, some of the districts became so oddly-shaped
that it caused them to be labeled "racial gerrymanders." See id. The racial
gerrymanders were attacked in federal court for denying White voters their right to
equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. See generally
Lawyer v. Dep't of Justice, 521 U.S. 567 (1997); Shaw v. Hunt (Shaw II) 517 U.S.
899 (1996); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900
(1995); United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737 (1995); Shaw v. Reno (Shaw I), 509
U.S. 630 (1993).
71. See Page v. Bartels, 144 F.Supp.2d 346, 348-49 (D.N.J. 2001). An
Apportionment Commission convened in early 2001 to apportion New Jersey's
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bipartisan New Jersey Apportionment Commission deadlocked on
a plan to reapportion the State's political districts, and could not
reach consensus by the constitutionally mandated deadline, the
Chief Justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court selected Larry
Bartels, a professor of politics and public affairs at Princeton
University, to break the tie. 72 Professor Bartels endorsed a plan,
similar to the one submitted by the Democrats, that reconfigured
the boundaries of Districts 27, 28, 29, and 34 in northern New
Jersey.73 Under the old districting system, Districts 27, 28, and
29 each elected Black representatives. 7 4  The Bartels plan
proposed a decrease in the percentage of Black voters in District
27 from 53 percent to 28 percent, in District 28 from 57 percent to
48 percent, and in District 29 from 48 percent to 39 percent, while
increasing the percentage of Black voters in District 34 from 4
percent to 35 percent. 75 The Commission eventually adopted the
Bartels plan along party-lines. 76
The plaintiffs - the Republican members of the New Jersey
Senate and General Assembly, Black residents of Essex County,
and Hispanic residents of Essex County and Hudson County -
immediately filed suit.7 7 They claimed that the Bartels plan
violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act because it distributed
Black voters who previously represented a majority of voters in
three districts into four districts where they would end up in the
minority. 78  The plaintiffs relied almost exclusively on the
statistical fact that Blacks would no longer constitute a majority of
voters in any of the districts to support their claim that the plan
would reduce or eliminate the opportunity of Blacks to elect
Senate and Assembly districts. Id. The chairs of the State committees of the
Democratic and Republican parties each appointed five people to the ten-member
Apportionment Commission. Id. The Commission met several times. Id. at 349.
72. See Page, 144 F.Supp. 2d. at 348-49 Professor Bartels is also a founding
director of the Center for the Study of Democratic Politics at the Woodrow Wilson
School of Public and International Affairs, a past president of the Methods Section
of the American Political Science Association, and a former chair of the Board of
Overseers of the National Election Studies. Page v. Bartels, 248 F.3d 175, 182-83
(3rd Cir. 2001). "Professor Bartels ha[d] studied and written extensively on
electoral politics and statistical models." Id. at 183.
73. Page, 144 F.Supp. 2d at 349, 352.
74. Id. at 354.
75. Id. at 353.
76. See id. at 349. Of the Republican-appointed members, four were not present
at the meeting where the plan was approved, and the one Republican-appointed
member present voted against the Bartels plan. Id. at 349 n.2. Therefore, the
Commission certified this plan by a vote of six to one. Id. at 349.
77. Id. at 349 n.3.
78. Id. at 353. Districts 27 and 34 are part of Essex County. See id. at 355.
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legislators of their choice. 7 9 They argued that the districts were
racially polarized and that therefore, Blacks would not be able to
elect the candidate of their choice under the Bartels plan.8 0 The
plaintiffs' expert witness projected that White candidates would
prevail over Black candidates in the newly-drawn districts due to
a "chilling effect" on Black voters' participation in the political
process when they comprise less than 50 percent of the voters in a
given district.8 1
79. Id. at 358. The court, however, proved to be interested not only in straight
statistics but also in the testimony of Black and Latino state legislators. See
Hirsch, supra note 9, at 14. In the hope of obtaining some favorable testimony, the
Republicans called one minority legislator, Black Senator Ronald L. Rice. Id. at 14-
15. Although Senator Rice lost the Democratic nomination for District 28, he
nonetheless testified that his new district would elect a Black Democrat in the
November general election and further admitted that the Bartels plan would
provide "fair representation for all New Jerseyans," including Blacks. Id.
80. Page, 144 F.Supp. 2d at 353.
81. Id. at 358. The plaintiffs expert witness, sociologist Dr. James Loewen,
analyzed precinct-level demographic and electoral data from four elections, a 1995
Democratic primary for General Assembly from District 28, and three countywide
races; the 1994 Democratic primary for the Essex County Executive and the 1994
and 1998 general elections for the same office. Id. at 359. He examined how Black,
White, and Latino populations voted in those elections and specifically looked at
how Whites and Blacks voted in districts where each racial group had a majority.
Id. at 359 n.ll. He then "conducted a correlation analysis to determine whether
there was a relationship between racial composition of a precinct and the election
outcome." Id. at 359 n.ll. He also performed an "ecological regression analysis" to
look at the percentage of the voting age population by race in each precinct to
determine which candidate each race voted for. Id. at 359 n.11. "Ecological
regression analysis" is a standard technique for inferring individual-level behavior
from aggregate (ecological) data. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 52-53 n.20.
(1986). Dr. Loewen found significant racial polarization in the 1994 and 1998
general elections for Essex County Executive, both of which resulted in a white
Republican narrowly defeating a Black Democrat. Page, 144 F.Supp. 2d at 353,
359. Based on Dr. Loewen's analysis, the plaintiffs asserted that such prevalent
racial bloc voting would prevent Blacks from relying on cross-over votes from other
racial groups to ensure victory of their preferred candidates. Id. at 353. The
Republican plaintiffs also contended that the interests of Hispanics and Blacks
were so different that they could not be considered members of the same voting
bloc. Id. When Dr. Loewen was asked whether the Bartels plan gave a fair
opportunity to Black and Latino voters to elect candidates of their choice for the
New Jersey Legislature, he testified that due to a "chilling effect" on racial
minorities' participation in the political process when they comprise less than 50%
of the voters in a given district, "the minority community's impression that it does
not have a reasonable opportunity to elect a candidate of its choice leads to less
political mobilization, fewer candidates, less money donated to campaigns, less
voter registration, and lower voter turn-out." Id. at 358. Dr. Loewen projected that
in the new District 27, a White candidate would receive 55% to 65% of the votes
and a Black candidate would receive 40% to 45% of the voters. Id. at 359. In new
District 34, Dr. Loewen projected that a White candidate would receive 52% to 62%
of the votes. Id. He concluded minority voters may be able to elect the white
candidate of their choice but "do not have the reasonable opportunity to elect the
candidate of their choice, the candidate who might be more identified with their
community." Id. at 359 n.12. Moreover, minority voters would not have a
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The defendants - the five Democratic members of the
Apportionment Commission, Professor Larry Bartels, the New
Jersey Secretary of State, and the New Jersey Attorney General -
argued that the districts were not racially polarized and that the
Bartels plan would increase, not decrease, minority voters'
opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice. 8 2 First, Professor
Bartels testified that he followed nine criteria in drafting the
apportionment plan, most of which were in accordance with
traditional districting principles.8 3 Second, minority legislators
testified that members of other minority groups helped them win
elections even when they did not run in a district where their own
race constituted a majority of voters.8 4 Finally, the defendants'
reasonable opportunity to elect the candidate of their choice. Id.
82. Page, 144 F.Supp. 2d at 358.
83. Id. These included:
(1) minimizing population deviation between the districts; ... (2) ensuring
fair representation of minority voters as required by the Voting Rights Act
and the federal Constitution; (3) keeping each of the forty existing districts
contiguous; (4) keeping each of the existing districts reasonably compact;
(5) respecting municipal boundaries by not splitting towns smaller than
Newark and Jersey City among different districts; (6) respecting voting
district boundaries; (7) avoiding any bias in favor of one or the other
political parties; (8) ensuring that some seats remained competitive; and
(9) minimizing voter disruption.
Id. These which entailed minimizing the situations where voters would have to
vote for different incumbents). Id. The Bartels plan's adherence to districting
principles probably precluded the plaintiffs from bringing a partisan dilution claim.
Partisan vote dilution, when a redistricting scheme reduces a political interest
group's electoral influence, is a difficult claim to make. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478
U.S. 109, 123 (1986) (stating that although partisan vote dilution claims are
justiciable, the burden of proof for such a claim is virtually insurmountable). See
also Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 730 (1983) (stating that a redistricting plan
is unconstitutional only if a state diverges from roughly equal numbers of people in
each district and is unable to justify those deviations); cf. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler,
394 U.S. 526, 538 (1969) (Fortas, J. concurring) (holding that redistricting plans
that have deliberately distorted district boundaries for partisan purposes are
unconstitutional). Pressure from an unusually high standard for partisan vote
dilution claims often forces political interest groups, which have a vested interest in
the redistricting process, to characterize any legal challenges to redistricting plans
as racial vote dilution claims. See Boyd & Markman, supra note 24, at 1367-68.
84. Page, 144 F.Supp. 2d at 356. The minority legislators all testified that they
prevailed in state legislative elections because of significant cross-over voting from
other racial groups. Id. For example, United States Congressman Robert
Menendez, a Cuban American, stated that he received wide support from both
Black and White voters. Id. He testified that when he first ran for Congress in
1992, he prevailed with 68% of the vote against a White opponent in a
Congressional District that contained only a 25% Latino voting population and an
8% Black voting population. Id. at 356. Furthermore, Assemblywoman Nia Gill, a
Black member of the Assembly from former District 27, testified that she had
always received support from Latino and White voters. Id. Gill stated that she
would run for Senate in new District 34, where she would be seated under the
Bartels plan. Id. She was confident that a Black candidate could be elected to an
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expert witness projected that the minority-preferred candidates
would likely win under the Bartels plan because the political
affiliation of a candidate, not the race, determined which
candidate would win in the newly-drawn districts.8 5
On April 12, 2001, a district judge denied the plaintiffs'
application for a preliminary injunction that would have halted
the implementation of the Bartels plan.86 The Third Circuit held
an expedited hearing on April 23rd, and ruled that the plaintiffs'
Assembly position in new District 27 and that she, or another Black candidate,
would be elected to the Senate in new District 34 where there was to be only a 35%
Black voting population. Id. Gill explained that the districts in Essex County have
a Democratic majority, and therefore, "the real contest would be in the Democratic
primary." Id. According to Gill, the winner of the Democratic primary is likely to
be elected in the general election. Id. As of the date of the trial, only Black women
had filed to run in the Democratic primary for State Senator in new District 34.
Gill testified that even if another non-minority candidate were to run in the
primary, she would still be confident a Black candidate would be elected. Id. Other
minority legislators also testified that they were elected in districts where as few as
30% of the voters were from their own racial group. Id. Assemblyman Wilfredo
Caraballo, a Latino, stated that he won the Assembly seat in District 28 with the
substantial support of Black and White voters. Id. at 357. District 28 only
contained a 16% Latino voting population in 1995 when he first ran for the General
Assembly. Id. It could be inferred from Caraballo's statement that reducing the
number of Blacks in District 27 and increasing their numbers in District 34 would
not diminish their opportunities to elect the candidate of their choice, but rather,
the Bartels plan would augment their opportunities. Id.
85. Id. at 361. The defendants' expert witness, Dr. Allan Lichtman, examined the
results of every general election and some primary elections for the state Senate
and General Assembly held between 1991 and 1999 in the eleven districts from
which minority legislators have been elected and also in one predominantly White
district. Id. at 360. He also looked at six countywide elections held from 1994
through 1999 in Essex County where there was competition between Black and
White candidates. Id. In total, Dr. Lichtman analyzed "over 150 separate
elections," including more than 150 state-legislative contests in each of the twelve
legislative districts that contained most of the state's minority residents and all of
its Black and Latino state legislators. Id. First, he noted that eight of the fifteen
Blacks currently serving in the state legislature were elected from districts that
contained less than 30% Black voting age population. Id. at 365. Second, he found
that more than half of the White voters in Districts 27, 28, and 29 tended to vote
Democratic, even in elections where a Black Democrat was pitted against a White
Republican. Id. Third, Dr. Lichtman projected that the outcome of biracial
elections in new Districts 27 and 34 would be the election of the candidate
preferred by Black voters. Id. More specifically, Lichtman testified that in every
contest, the Democratic candidate, on average, won at least 83% of the minority
vote, regardless of the candidate's race. Id. at 360-61. The same Democratic
candidates, on average, won approximately half of the White vote. Id. at 365. Even
in the most racially polarized legislative contests where a Black (or Latino)
Democrat ran against a White Republican, the White vote never fell below 39% for
the Democratic candidate. Id. at 361. Therefore, even if the race of the district
were changed under the Bartels plan, minority candidates would still prevail
among all demographic groups. Id.
86. Id. at 350. The judge refused their request to prevent the defendants from
implementing the Bartels plan because the plaintiffs had "no likelihood" of
ultimately prevailing on the merits. Id.
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constitutional claims were not frivolous. The Third Circuit
vacated the district judge's order on jurisdictional grounds, and
remanded the case to a three-judge district court for a full
evidentiary trial.8 7 On May 2nd, three federal judges who resided
in Essex County unanimously rejected the plaintiffs' constitutional
claims on all counts.88 Although the plaintiffs threatened to
appeal the case directly to the U.S. Supreme Court, they did not
seek an injunction pending that appeal.89 Without the injunction,
New Jersey held primary elections under the Bartels plan.
90
The three-judge panel adopted the Gingles threshold test, but
emphasized the third prong to assess whether the plaintiffs had a
valid Section 2 claim. 9 1 First, the court rejected the notion that
districts with of a majority of minorities must retain (or create)
that majority. 9 2  The court relied on the Supreme Court's
declaration that "Section 2 contains no per se prohibitions against
particular types of districts... [o]nly if the apportionment scheme
has the effect of denying a protected class the equal opportunity to
elect its candidate of choice does it violate Section 2.
9 3
The court then focused on the third prong of the Gingles test
"out of turn" because, as the court noted, the bulk of the evidence
and testimony addressed this element.9 4 Ultimately, the court
found that the total effect of the Bartels plan would be to enhance
the opportunity for minority political participation.
9 5
Based in part on testimonial evidence that Hispanics often
vote for the same candidates as Blacks, the court determined that
"minority voting age population" (MVAP), was the relevant
demographic figure.96 The court took note of the small sample size
used by the plaintiffs' expert and refused to give a great deal of
weight to his conclusions. 9 7 The two general election contests that
87. Id. at 351.
88. Hirsch, supra note 9, at 17.
89. Id. at 18.
90. Id.
91. Page, 144 F.Supp. 2d at 364.
92. See id. at 364-65.
93. Id. at 363 citing Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 155 (1993) (emphasis
added). See also Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020 (1994) (noting that
although majority-minority districts may be necessary in some instances, in other
jurisdictions coalitions of different groups may have the effect of electing minority
candidates).
94. Page, 144 F.Supp. 2d at 364.
95. Id. at 364-65.
96. Id. at 358-65.
97. Id. at 365. Dr. Loewen found that an overwhelming majority of White voters
chose the White candidate in three of the four elections he analyzed. Id. From just
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the plaintiffs' expert analyzed appeared to be outliers, with an
unusually low White voting percentage for Black Democratic
candidates. 9 8  In contrast, the defendants' expert based his
conclusions on data gathered from over 150 elections and testified
that racial polarization did not and would not defeat the election of
minority-preferred candidates.9 9 The court also relied heavily on
testimony from minority legislators who supported the Bartels
plan and projected that the plan would increase minority election
opportunities over the next decade. 100
The court attached considerable weight to evidence other
courts rarely considered, such as expert witness testimony that
revealed that many of the White voters relocated into new District
27 as well as White voters who remained in District 34 were
Republican.101 Those White Republican voters would not,
therefore, affect election outcomes in districts where Democrats
still had a clear majority. 10 2 The court also accepted evidence that
Black Democrats were more likely than White Democrats to vote
in the Democratic primary.10 3 This evidence led the court to
conclude that the Black-preferred, Democratic primary election
winner would also likely win the general election, regardless of
whether the candidate is Black or White. 10 4  The evidence
these four elections, Dr. Loewen concluded that racial polarization appeared to be a
problem in Essex County, and therefore Black voters in Districts 27 and 34 could
not count on sufficient White cross-over votes to ensure they could elect their
preferred candidates. Id. Other factors influencing the validity and applicability of
Dr. Loewen's data set troubled the court, including his focus on county-wide, not
legislative, elections; the fact and relevancy of incumbencies; and special
circumstances that affected at least half of the elections considered. Id. at 360
n.13.
98. Id. at 359 n.il.
99. See supra note 85. First, Dr. Lichtman noted that eight of the fifteen Blacks
currently serving in the state legislature were elected from districts that contained
less than 30% Black voting age population. Page, 144 F.Supp. 2d at 365. Second,
he found that more than half of the White voters in Districts 27, 28, and 29 tended
to vote Democratic, even in elections where a minority Democrat was pitted against
a White Republican. Id. There was only one exception, which the court considered
an aberration. Id. In one Senate general election, 61% of Whites voted for the
White Republican candidate and 39% for the Black Democrat in District 29. Id.
Third, Dr. Lichtman projected that the outcome of biracial elections in new
Districts 27 and 34 would be the election of that candidate preferred by Black
voters. Id. In sum, Dr. Lichtman opined that the most salient factor in
determining the winner of biracial elections was the political party, not the race, of
the candidate. Id. at 361.




104. Id. at 361, 366.
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supported the court's conclusion that, under the Bartels plan,
Blacks would have the same opportunity as other racial groups to
participate in the political process and to elect their preferred
candidates. After considering the entire record, the court
ultimately concluded that the plaintiffs failed to meet the third
prong of the Gingles threshold test.10 5
As the court and the defendants predicted, minority
candidates captured a record number of nominations to the state
legislature from Essex County and statewide. In Districts 28 and
29, all six minority incumbents were renominated and
reelected. 10 6  In District 27, Black Democrat Mims Hackett
captured the General Assembly seat. 10 7 In District 34, Black
Democrats Nia Gill and Willis Edwards captured a Senate seat
and an Assembly seat, respectively. 10 8 Ultimately, the Bartels
plan led to a record number of minority nominations and elections
in the 2001 New Jersey primary.10 9
III. ANALYSIS
Prong 1: "Sufficiently Large and Geographically Compact"
The lower courts have interpreted the first prong in Gingles
to require an analysis of the voting age population. 1 10 This
interpretation does not extend far enough. Courts should also
consider other factors potentially preventing minority voters from
casting their votes. For example, a court should consider
citizenship status because the minority population may not be
"sufficiently large and geographically compact" once non-citizens
are discounted. 11 1  A court's determination of whether a
population is "sufficiently large and geographically compact"
should also take into account evidence of historically lower
minority voter turnout within the community in comparison to
White voter turnout.1 12
The Page court went even further than these
105. Id. at 366.
106. See New Jersey State Legislature, Legislative Roster 2002-2003 Session
(2002), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/members/roster.asp.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See Page, 144 F.Supp. 2d 346, 357; Hirsch, supra note 9, at 19.
110. See supra notes 39-48 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 39-48 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 39-48 and accompanying text.
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recommendations when it analyzed the three prongs of the Gingles
test.113 It did not apply the first Gingles prong in a vacuum. 114
Even though there were enough Black voters to constitute a
"sufficiently large and geographically compact" population in three
old districts, the Bartels plan split Black voters among four new
districts. 115 The three-judge panel did not find this was a per se
violation of Section 2.116 The court relied on expert testimony and
minority legislators' statements to conclude that splitting the
three majority-minority districts increased minority electoral
opportunity.. 117 Rather than subscribe to rigid numerical
calculations of the voting age population, the court appropriately
considered the total political effect of the districting plan. 1 8 This
is a logical approach when plaintiffs cannot show that polarized
voting exists and when MVAP is the relevant demographic factor.
Testimonial evidence demonstrated that the majority of voters in
the districts studied will continue to cast their votes for minority
Democrats in biracial elections. 119 Therefore, it is not necessary
for a minority group or coalition to maintain a majority to ensure
election of minority candidates. 120 The more sensible approach in
light of Section 2's goal of equal opportunity for minority voters to
elect their preferred candidates is to evaluate district plans for
their total effects. If the court had applied a bright-line approach
to Page's first prong, it is likely that fewer minority candidates
would have been elected.
Prong 2: A Minority Group Should Be Defined as a Multi-
Ethnic Coalition
The Page court found that since Blacks and Hispanics often prefer
the same candidates, total MVAP was the relevant demographic
figure. 121  Using MVAP (52%) rather than Black Voting Age
Population (BVAP) (35%) to evaluate the effect of the plan in
District 34, the court concluded that Blacks would have the same
opportunities as Whites to elect the candidates of their choice,
even if all White voters in that district vote against a Black
113. See supra notes 101-104 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 101-104 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 78-81.
116. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 96-104 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 96-104 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 84.
120. See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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candidate. 122 Today's racial politics support the notion that the
definition of a "minority group" should be expanded to include
coalitions of different minority groups. 123 Since racial vote dilution
claims must be brought in the aggregate, the definition of who
belongs in the aggregate should change as racial coalitions build
and racial identities combine. 124  If Blacks, Hispanics, and
multiracial individuals prefer the same candidates, Section 2's
goal of ensuring equal political opportunity is furthered when a
"minority group" includes multiple races. 125
The Sixth Circuit's decision to deny standing to multiracial
coalitions as a combined "minority group" is contrary to Section 2's
goal. 126 Practically speaking, it is unrealistic in some jurisdictions
to separate the interests of one minority group from another.
First, it is difficult to identify those in the minority using rigid
racial categories. 127 Second, Section 2's historical context lends no
support to the notion that Section 2 only protects Blacks, and not
Hispanics or other minority groups, from vote dilution. 128
The Page court provides an appropriate framework for
considering the combined interests of a "minority group." From
testimonial evidence, the court rightly determined that MVAP, not
BVAP, would assure that minority groups have equal political
opportunity. 29 In situations where citizens of different races
prefer the same candidate, a court should consider the effect of a
redistricting plan based on the total minority population's
electoral choices. The election results confirmed that the Page
court reached the right conclusion.
Prong 3: Polarized Voting Should No Longer be the
Evidentiary Centerpiece of a Section 2 Claim.
The Gingles Court established that the crucial factor used to
identify vote dilution was the occurrence of racially polarized
voting.130 Although courts and commentators have concluded that
polarized voting is the evidentiary centerpiece of a vote dilution
122. Page v. Bartels, 144 F.Supp.2d 346, 353-58 (D.N.J. 2001).
123. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 52.
125. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
126. See Nixon v. Kent County, 76 F.3d 1381, 1393 (6th Cir. 1996).
127. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
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claim, 13 1 the Page court rightly rejected this approach. 132
The Page court was unconvinced that the vote in Essex
County was racially polarized, but did not end the Gingles analysis
there. 133 The court continued to evaluate the contours of the third
prong, resulting in a clearer understanding of New Jersey's local
politics and the actual effect of the Bartels plan. 3 4 The court
examined evidence showing that the primary often decided the
general elections in highly Democratic districts and that the Black
electorate was more likely to vote in the primaries. 35 The court
also considered whether the addition of White Republicans to the
new districts would endanger the minorities' chances to elect their
preferred candidate and determined this would not adversely
affect minority candidates. 3 6  These factors supported the
defendants' claim that the Bartels plan enhanced, rather than
diminished, minority voting opportunities.137
The court's rationale throughout is appropriate and
consistent. A Section 2 claim emphasizes a districting plan's total
effect on minority voters, in light of the Act's goal of protecting
opportunity for minority electoral participation. 38 Rather than
subscribe to a rigid determination of whether the vote was racially
polarized, the court appropriately considered the opinions of
minority legislators experienced and knowledgeable of the local
political scene, as well as statistical projections that used voting
data to analyze biracial legislative contests in Essex County. 139
Evaluating the total effect of a plan, rather than evaluating the
claim according to broad and rigid factors better fulfilled the goal
of Section 2 and is the appropriate measure of racial vote
dilution. 140
Additionally, using polarized voting as the threshold test of a
Section 2 claim unnecessarily assumes that Whites and minorities
are perpetual political enemies. Coalitions comprised of Whites
and minorities could not bring a Section 2 claim because the
Voting Rights Act presupposes that Whites and minorities have
131. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 101-104 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 101-104 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 101-104 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 101-104 and accompanying test.
136. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 96-105 and accompanying test.
139. See supra notes 96-105 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 96-105 and accompanying text.
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opposing political preferences.14 ' Page is a jurisdiction where some
Whites and minority groups had the same political preferences. 142
The Gingles assumption that Whites will always have differing
political preferences than minorities is no longer true. 143
Therefore, the threshold test for Section 2 claims should recognize
that White support of minority-preferred candidates may aid a
minority group. Page demonstrates that coalitions of minority
voters in the numerical minority, with the support of White voters,
may elect the candidate of their choice. 144
Polarized Voting Alone Does Not Always Reveal Whether
Minority Preferred Candidates Will Be Defeated
The Third Circuit is one of the first courts to approve a
redistricting plan that separates, rather than consolidates, Black
voting populations.145 Prior court decisions and the Department of
Justice mandated the creation of majority-minority districts
whenever possible. 46 This well-intentioned but static approach
would have led to much different election results in New Jersey.
Lower courts should heed the Supreme Court's directive that
creating majority-minority districts is not a Voting Rights Act
requirement and that there is per se prohibition against creating
certain types of voting districts. 147  The Page court rightly
dismisses the notion that districting plans must create and may
not dissolve majority-minority districts. As primary and election
results confirmed, reducing the number of Blacks in three districts
enhanced minority voting strength. 148
CONCLUSION
Although the Gingles test applied rigidly is rife with
problems, an analysis based in part on the three prongs is still
necessary. Courts should follow Page's flexible approach by
incorporating the Gingles factors in an evaluation of the total
effect of a redistricting plan on minority voters' opportunity to
elect candidates of their choice. An evaluation of a variety of
141. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 73-76, 105 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 93.
148. See Hirsch supra note 9, at 18-19; David Kocieniewski, Trenton Democrats
Are Out ofDoghouse, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.7, 2001, at D7.
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factors affecting minority politics revealed through the testimony
of minority legislators, the current status of local politics, and the
statistical projections of relevant data sets will give better effect to
a "total effects" test.
In the context of racial vote dilution claims, Page upholds a
flexible approach in contrast to the static, bright-line Gingles test.
Today's changing racial politics indicate a need to revamp the rigid
Gingles test that is based upon outdated assumptions. A flexible,
total political effects test will ensure that claims spurred on by
political interest groups are stopped and, at the same time, that
minority groups denied equal voting rights have viable legal
recourse.
